The announcement of European Union sanctions against three Rwandan generals, a key state institution, and the country’s main mining company could have triggered a political earthquake in Kigali. Yet, in official media such as The New Times, Igihe, Kigali Today, and even on national television RBA and popular private TV channels like TV1 and TV10, absolute silence prevails.
No statement from Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe. No comment from government spokesperson Yolande Makolo. This silence stands in stark contrast to the frantic agitation of the Rwandan regime in the weeks leading up to these sanctions when Kigali deployed all efforts to avoid them.
European Sanctions: A Diplomatic Failure
Aware of the looming threat, Kigali undertook extensive diplomatic efforts to prevent the sanctions. Olivier Nduhungirehe launched an intense lobbying campaign among his European counterparts. As a last resort, a high-level delegation, including Rwanda’s intelligence chief Aimable Havugiyaremye and Patrick Karuretwa, the chief strategist of Rwandan operations in the DRC, traveled to Brussels. This “last-chance visit” aimed to persuade the EU High Representative, Kaja Kallas, and Commissioner Jozef Sikela to drop the sanctions.
But the EU did not waver. The verdict fell, striking at the heart of Kigali’s strategic apparatus.
The EU: A Weakened Strategic Pillar
Unlike the United States, whose cooperation with Kigali is now primarily military, the European Union has become Rwanda’s most important economic and strategic partner in recent years. This relationship extends far beyond development aid, covering massive investments, trade in strategic resources, and infrastructure financing.
A striking example is the Global Gateway program, through which the EU pledged €900 million to Rwanda in December 2023. During her visit to Kigali, Ursula von der Leyen sealed a key agreement on the supply of critical minerals, positioning Rwanda as a major player in the European supply chain for coltan and other essential resources.
These agreements are now in question. In Brussels, more and more voices are denouncing a major strategic mistake: strengthening a regime accused of plundering DRC resources and destabilizing the region.
Diverting Attention: Belgium as the Scapegoat
Faced with this diplomatic failure, Kigali has adopted a well-practiced response: deflect attention by blaming Belgium.
To lead this offensive, the regime deployed Jean-Damascène Bizimana, Minister of National Unity and an ideological hardliner. Known for his extreme positions and political instrumentalization of the genocide, Bizimana accuses Brussels of promoting a so-called genocide ideology and protecting genocidaires.
Since the announcement of the EU sanctions, he has been omnipresent in Rwandan media. Instead of directly addressing the measures against its generals and institutions, national television and pro-government channels continuously broadcast his incendiary speeches against Belgium.
Although crude, this tactic builds on a precedent that worked: for years, Rwanda used genocide memory to silence France on its regional responsibilities. Under this pressure, Emmanuel Macron ultimately aligned with the Rwandan regime’s official narrative. Kigali now hopes to replicate this success with Belgium, pushing it to tone down its criticism under the guise of moral obligation.
Yet, Kigali knows that Brussels is not the driving force behind these sanctions. The U.S., the UK, and Canada have taken a hard line independently, while the EU acted collectively, propelled by several member states.
Most European countries, including those without direct strategic interests in the Great Lakes region, have supported a firm stance against Kigali. This firmness aligns with their approach to Russia regarding the Ukraine conflict.
Moreover, according to our sources, a new round of sanctions is being prepared in Washington. The Trump administration is considering toughening its stance on Kigali’s support for the M23. In Brussels, an additional package of sanctions has already received preliminary approval and is only awaiting developments on the ground. If the conflict in the DRC worsens or Kigali remains intransigent, these measures could be deployed swiftly.
Ruki Karusisi: Kagame’s Shadow Man Leading the Covert Response
Rwanda’s response is not limited to a media campaign. According to insiders, Ruki Karusisi, one of the sanctioned generals, recently removed from his position as commander of the Special Operations Forces, has not been sidelined. On the contrary, Paul Kagame has entrusted him with a clandestine task force in Europe and Belgium to influence political and media circles and minimize the impact of the sanctions.
Nicknamed Rocky, Karusisi is a shadow operative of the Rwandan regime. A former personal bodyguard of Kagame, he climbed the power ranks due to his loyalty and efficiency in sensitive missions. His family is deeply embedded in the regime: his wife, Iza Ireme, is a key executive at Crystal Ventures, the RPF’s financial arm, while his sister, Diane Karusisi, heads BK (Bank of Kigali), known as Kagame’s bank for its central role in financing the regime’s operations.
This is not his first covert assignment. In the 2010s, Karusisi was tasked with developing the Intervention Group, a unit specialized in espionage, intimidation, and interference in Belgium. This group has been implicated in operations targeting Rwandan exiles and critics of the regime.
Today, the M23’s military advances in the DRC are credited to him. Far from losing influence, he has gained prestige within Kagame’s inner circle. His management of the DRC conflict and his ability to operate in the shadows to protect the regime’s interests have reinforced his strategic role rather than diminishing it.
M23’s Withdrawal from Negotiations: Kigali Plays the Chaos Card
But this offensive is not limited to Brussels. Kigali has deliberately orchestrated the M23’s withdrawal from the Luanda negotiations—a calculated maneuver aimed at escalating the crisis and increasing pressure on states supporting the DRC’s sovereignty. By fueling instability on the ground, the Rwandan regime seeks to impose a dilemma on its opponents: either they maintain their firm stance and risk an uncontrollable escalation of the conflict, or they soften their position to prevent a regional conflagration. This strategy is designed to prove that sanctions and diplomatic pressure only worsen the situation and that a direct confrontation with Kigali leads to a deadlock.
Surprise Meeting Between Tshisekedi and Kagame in Qatar
Rather than following the now-blocked Luanda negotiation framework, Paul Kagame has chosen to engage in dialogue under Qatari mediation—an actor perceived as neutral and less susceptible to Western pressure.
This choice is part of a well-defined strategy: by bypassing the EU and the United States, Kagame aims to sideline Western powers from the issue and impose a framework where he controls the terms of the discussions. He is applying the same logic as in his campaign against Belgium: sanction us, and you lose all influence. Only actors deemed more flexible, such as Qatar or Turkey, remain as viable interlocutors. In fact, Kagame had already approached Turkey to play a mediating role, illustrating his intent to steer the matter away from traditional diplomatic channels.
But the West is not Kigali’s only target. Tensions with João Lourenço have escalated, as Luanda has become increasingly aware of Rwandan maneuvers and refuses to be manipulated. Anticipating stricter mediation from Lourenço, Kagame is actively lobbying to replace him with a panel of former African heads of state—figures who would be easier to influence and who would take months to grasp the complexity of the conflict. This delay would provide Kagame with a strategic reprieve, allowing him to continue his actions without immediate constraints.
A Qatari Mediation That Primarily Serves Kigali
At the beginning of 2023, Qatar had already offered its good offices to facilitate mediation between the DRC and Rwanda, but Félix Tshisekedi declined the offer at the time. Since then, trade relations between Kinshasa and Doha have intensified, making this mediation more acceptable in the eyes of Congolese authorities.
Qatar’s interest in this process is primarily economic. Doha wants to avoid Rwanda—where it has made significant investments, particularly in air transport and tourism, two sectors currently in freefall due to the security situation—becoming a financial loss. However, despite its experience in mediation, Qatar lacks in-depth knowledge of the Congolese issue and does not fully grasp its history or intricacies. This lack of expertise is likely to benefit Kigali, which is a master at manipulating negotiations.
Tshisekedi Is Playing for Time, but at What Cost?
On the Congolese side, Tshisekedi had no alternative. The military situation for the FARDC is critical: the M23 continues to advance, and the under-equipped and exhausted Congolese army is struggling to contain the offensive. Any dialogue, even a biased one, could slow down the rebels’ progress and buy precious time to reorganize defenses.
At the same time, Tshisekedi is working to consolidate his diplomatic and political support, particularly in the United States. He is banking on finalizing the economic partnership he is negotiating with the Trump administration—a strategic lever that, once secured, could strengthen his position against Kigali.
Finally, by engaging in this mediation, he aims to maintain his international diplomatic credibility by demonstrating that he remains open to negotiations. However, by accepting Doha as the new framework for dialogue, he risks weakening the role of Western powers and Luanda, giving Kagame the opportunity to set the pace and dictate the terms of the process.
A Risky Gamble for Kigali
Two scenarios loom. In one, Kinshasa’s allies may cave to Rwandan blackmail, offering concessions in hopes of pacifying Kagame. This would relieve diplomatic pressure without real consequences, solidifying his regional influence while deflecting Western scrutiny.
Alternatively, if DRC’s international partners maintain pressure, the Rwandan regime could find itself cornered. Kagame’s talk and fight and chaos strategies will face their limits if they fail to convince. Tougher sanctions and increased diplomatic isolation would further weaken Kigali, with potentially dire economic and political consequences.
As Rwanda depends on international aid and foreign investment, deeper sanctions could trigger an internal crisis. Betting everything on intimidation and escalation, Kagame is playing a dangerous game. If he succeeds, he will temporarily strengthen his regional grip. But if he fails, he may well initiate the downfall of his rule.
By insisting on imposing his rules, Kigali risks colliding with the contradictions of its own strategy.
Irene Nyenyeli
www.jambonews.net
